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Inflation always has a monetary dimension, but managing infla-
tion is not a simple question of monetary management.  Other
factors to contend with are the indexation process (including
policies on wage and price controls), the level and financial
composition of fiscal deficits, and supply conditions. How these
interact has crucial implications for policy design, as shown in
this paper on Zimbabwe.
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Adjustment programs typicafly include not only  inflation and price changes. The authors charac-
fiscal reform but also price liberalization,  terize the situation in terms of the three main
devaluation, and trade policy reform - includ-  transmission mechanisms for inflation: the
ing reduced subsidies.  Authorities impWlment-  fiscal-monetaiy process; direct cost-push
ing such programs commonly fear die potential  factors; and real factors.
inflationary effects of a combination of devalu-
ation, reduced subsidies, and price decontrol.  Al  of these are important in Zimbabwe, but
there a.e often conflicts.  Low food or utility
Given this combination, a simplistic mone-  prices keep prices down but lead to higher
tarist diagnosis of inflation is insufficient. If  subsidies and hence to higher deficits, the
inflation - even if only in the short run - can  financing of which can increase inflation.
rise because of devaluation or reduced subsidies,  Similarly, exchange rate devaluation is often
attempts to control it completely may require  viewed as inflationary, but insufficient exchange
fiscal and monetary control  .o  great as to cause  rate adjustment can lead to both parallel markets
recession.  If cost-push factors arising from the  and a tight import constraint, resulting in lower
adjustment program generate inflation, it may be  growth of output.
necessary to allow for the inflation and plan for
a slower adjustment program, one that is more  The authors conclude that one must always
acceptable socially.  The design and pace of a  go beyond a simple monetary account of the
successful adjustment program hinge on the  inflation process even if inflation always has a
correct diagnosis and management of inflation.  monetary dimension.  Other significant factors
are management of the indexation process (in-
This empirical study of Zimbabwe is the  cluding policies on wage and price controls), the
first in a series that will include studies on  level and financial composition of fiscal deficits,
Ghana, Cote d'lvoire,  and Malawi. The study  and supply conditions.
addresses the impact of govemment policies on
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I:  INTRODUCTION
Adjustment  programs  typically  involve  a  complex  policy  package  which
include  price  liberalization,  devaluation  and  trade  policy  reforms,  as  well  as
public enterprise and fiscal reform, including  reduction  in subsidies  and
rationalization  of the  public  investment  program  (CEC,  1988). A common  fear
of the authorities  implementing  such programs  is the potential  inflationary
effects  of a  combination of devaluation, subsidy reduction and price
decontrol. In this situation  a simplistic  monetarist  diagnosis  of inflation
is insufficient.  If irflation,  even  if  only in  the  short-run,  can  rise  due to
cost-push elements arising from devaluation  or a  reduction  in subsidies,
attempts  to control  it completely  may require  fiscal  and  monetary  control  so
large  that it will  bring  unwarranted  recession  in the  economy.  If cost-push
factors  arising  from  the  adjustment  program  generate  inflation  in the  economy,
it may be necessary  to allow  for this inflation,  and plan for a slower  but
less painful  adjustment  program,  and therefore  one that is more acceptable
socially.  The implication  of a less drastic  and slower  adjustment  program
could be larger  external  financing.  The design  and pace of a successful
adjustment  program therefore  depends  critically  on a correct  diagnosis  of
inflationary  forces  in the  economy. This  paper  on Zimbabwe  is the  first  in  a
series that will present empirical work on this question in Sub-Saharan
Africa. 1
1/  The  other  countries  in  this  study  are  Ghana,  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Malawi.-2-
Zimbabwe  has  had a fiscal  deficit  of close  to 10 percent  of GDP for
almost  a decade,  continued  losses  on agricultural  marketing  boards,  a mixture
of profits and  losses on other parastatals  and a moderately overvalued
exchange  rate.  The Government  places  high priority  on maintaining  control
over  general  inflation  (in  the  10-15  percent  range)  and  has  used  a combination
of carefui  monetary  policy  and  price  and  wage  controls  to effect  this. It is
concerned  both about  slipping  into  a devaluation/inflation  spiral  and  over  the
impact  of price  changes  on the  real  wage  of low-income  urban  households.
The framework  used for  the  analysis  of inflation  in  Zimbabwe  in this
paper is designed  to directly  address  the impact  of government  policies  on
inflation  and price  changes.  It attempts  to integrate  within  one framework
three transmission  mechanisms  for inflation  in Zimbabwe:  via the fiscal-
monetary  process;  via  direct  cost-push  factors;  and  through  real  factors. All
of these  are important  in  Zimbabwe  (as  described  in  Section  II),  but there  are
often  conflicts  between  the  policies. Low food  or utility  prices  keep prices
down but lead to higher subsidies,  and consequently  higher deficits  whose
financing  can lead  to higher  inflation. Similarly,  exchange  rate  devaluation
is  often  viewed  as inflationary,  but insufficient  exchange  rate  adjustment  can
lead  to both the emergence  of parallel  markets  in the  short  run, and  a tight
import  constraint  in  the  medium  term  due  to lowered  export  earnings,  resulting
in lower  output  growth. The framework  developed  in  this  paper  is designed  to
address  these  and  other  policy  choices  for  Zimbabwe.
The model (described  below in Section  III) goes beyond the simple
monetarist  approach  which  is usually  adopted  in analysis  of African  inflation
in three  ways:  first,  it  undertakes  a broad  disaggregation  of prices  between
controlled  and uncontrolled as well as traded and non-traded prices and-3-
incorporates  an account  of wage behavior;  second,  it includes  both standard
fiscal/monetary  accounting  relations  and  the  effect  of  price  and  exchange  rate
changes on the fiscal  deficit;  third,  it incorporates  simple real economy
relationships  between  investment,  output,  trade  and  the  real  exchan3e  rate.
The approach  adopted  here, in some  ways, synthesizes  the monetarist
and cost-push  schools  of inflation.  The monetarists  a la Friedman  (1968)
argue that cost-push factors such as food prices, wage or exchange  rate
changes  can only cause  a shift  in the  price  level  but cannot  explain  how it
translates  into  sustained  inflation. For this to happen one  needs  monetary
accommodation,  without  which the inflationary  process  stalls. While this is
no doubt  true  we argue  in this  paper,  that  while  money  can  be viewed  as the
proximate  cause  of inflation,  cost-push  factors  can drive inflation  directly
or indirectly  by bringing  about  changes  in the  rate of monetization  and the
velocity  of circulation  of money. The  latter  process  works  through  the  impact
of exchange  rate  and  wage  changes,  as  well as  changes  in  administered  food  and
public  service  prices  (a common  feature  in  most developing  countries),  which
affect  the  size of the fiscal  deficit  which in turn  gets  monetized  and leads
to inflation.
The focus  of previous  analytical  work in this area  has been on the
interaction  between  exchange  rate changes  and inflation. When the exchange
rate is administered  it acts  as a stabilizer  to the inflationary  process  but
at the cost of trade imbalances  or growth  (Khan  and Lizondo,  1986).  This
happens  because  as inflation  accelerates  due  to  high fiscal  deficits  or cost-
push factors such as an increase  in food prices, the real exchange  rate
appreciates.  Where  the nominal exchange rate is allowed to adjust to
inflation  the inflationary  process  can become  automatic  (Drazen  and Helpman,-4-
1986 and  var.  Wijnbergen,  1988). This is  because  inflation  and  exchange  rate
changes feed on each other.  Similar  problems  arise in the case of dual
exchange  rates  (Dornbusch,  1986  and  Pinto,  1988),  when the  government  attempts
to control  exchange  rate changes  and there  is a  parallel  (free)  market for
foreign  exchange. As the official  rate  remains  fixed  and the  parallel  rate
depreciates,  export earnings channelled  into the official  exchange  market
decline  and  the  duality  in the  exchange  market  becomes  unsustainable.  With  a
rising  black  market  premium  the  implicit  tax  on exchange  rate  transactions  in
the  official  market  increases. When  the  government  attempts  to unify  the two
markets,  it loses  the implicit  tax.  Unless  accompanying  fiscal  changes  are
brought  about,  the  higher  fiscal  deficit  (due  to the  loss  in the  implicit  tax
on foreign  exchange  transaction)  must  be monetized  leading  to  higher  inflation
which  leads  to further  depreciation  of the  parallel  market  exchange  rate.  A
destabilizing  process from unification  to higher  deficits,  higher inflation
and an increase  in the parallel  market  premium  can be established. Pinto
(1988) shows the oonditions under which this destabilizing  process can
develop.
Dual foreign  exchange  markets  are  not important  in  Zimbabwe,  but the
interactions  between  the  exchange  rate,  the  budget  and  inflation  are. This is
one aspect  of the overall  impact  of changes  in relative  prices  and  wages  on
the budget.  For example,  exchange  rate changes  can lead to higher  budget
deficits  in the short run which in turn fuel inflation,  requiring  further
exchange  rate  changes  to  maintain  a competitive  real  exchange  rate. This  type
of issue is tackled  through  the fiscal  component  of the model that allows
examination of the nature and  size of these effects and the level of
compensating  fiscal changes that are necessary to avoid an inflationary
spiral.^5-
While exchange rate changes contribute  to inflation,  insufficient
exchange  rate  adjustment  appreciates  the  real  exchanage  rate,  reducing  exports,
importing  capacity  and growth.  This provides  an example  of another  set of
influences  on inflation  that  have  received  attention  in  structuralist  accounts
of  inflation which  emphasize real constraints or  shortages in driving
inflation. While Zimbabwe  t.is  clearly  experienced  an aggregate  supply-side
constraint via  import rationing,  but it is not characterized  by  severe
sectoral  imbalances. Accordingly  real factors  are captured  at an aggregate
level,  rather  than  in terms  of sectoral  output  factors.
This paper is divided  as follows. Section  II describes  the  central
elements of macro-economic adjustment,  wage and pricing policy and the
financial  system  in Zimbabwe. Section  III describes  the  model and presents
the empirical  estimates  of the model.  In Section  IV the results  of policy
simulations  on three key issues in Zimbabwe are described--exchange  rate
depreciation,  reduction  in food  subsidies  and  wage-price  decontrol. The last
Section  concludes.-6-
II:  INFLATION.  MACROECONOMIC  ADJUSTMENT  AND PRICE-SETTING  IN ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe  is a country  of apparenx.  paradoxes  for an economist. Two
are notable in relation  to inflation:  the coexistence  of a quite moderate
inflation  rate with a large,  and predominantly  domestically  funded,  budget
deficit;  and the  existence  of  both  widespread  price  controls  and  tight  foreign
exchange  rationing,  but the  absence  of significant  parallel  markets.  Happily-
-for the econcmist--these  are only apparent, and empirical investigation
reveals  a quite  well-behaved  pattern  of relationships. Here  we describe  the
principal  characteristics  of the economy  that relate  to inflation:  the  main
trends  and relations  between inflation  and other factors;  the pattern  of a
macroeconomic  closure;  the  price  and wage-setting  process;  and  the
characteristics  of the financial  system.  The section  is concluded  with an
account  of the  main  current  concerns  that  have  a bearing  on inflation.
A.  Trends  and  Relations.
The  pattern  of inflation  for the  past two  decades  is illustrated  in
Figures  II.1-3,  using the  high and low income  indices  of consumer  inflation
and the GDP deflator. 2 These reveal that Zimbabwe  is traditionally  a
relatively  moderate  inflation  country that has experienced  one significant
21  The Central  Statistics  Offices  maintains  two consumer  price indices  for
high and low income  households. These  are based on expenditure  weights
from  surveys  in  the  late  1970s;  they  are  in the  process  of  revision  on the
basis  of the  1984/85  household  expenditure  survey. When  overall  consumer
inflation is referred tn,.  this is the unweighted average of the two
indices.-7-
Figure  11.  I
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1977  MI8  1985surge  in  prices  since  independence--in  the  1981-82  period. The  inflation  rate
dropped  after  this  episode,  but there  has been a general  upward  shift  in the
average  rate  compared  with the  pre-independence  period:  as Figure  II.2 shows,
in the  1970s  domestic  inflation  was often  below  foreign  inflation  whereas  the
reverse  is generally  true  in the  1980s. 3 This  figure  also  reveals  two  other
striking  results. First,  changes  in import  prices  were dominated  by changes
in foreign  currency  terms  prior  to independence  while  exchange  rate  movements
have  become  much  more important  in the  1980s.  Second,  there  appears  to have
been a remarkable degree of insulation  of domestic price movements from
changes  in import  prices,  this is vividly  so for the two oil  rs but is
also  true  for  many of the  post-independence  years. This  will  be important  to
the  subsequent  analysis.
With respect  to the  three  domestic  indices,  Figure  II.3  shows  a quite
similar pattern of change for consumer  prices and the GDP deflator.  This
suggests the Government has not introduced  a wedge between producer  and
consumer prices; indeed overall consumer  price inflation  outpace  producer
inflation  in the 1980s. This  is evidence  for  the  assessment  of  whether  there
has been any permanent repression  of consumer  inflation  in Zimbabwe.  Of
course, it could be that both producer and consumer inflation  have been
repressed 4 and so this was directly explored  further,  using a test for
..  This applies whether an index of Zimbabwe's import prices or other
international  indices  are  used.
£/  Or that the GDP deflators  are heavily influenced  by measured  consumer
prices.-9-
repressed  inflation  developed  for  China. 5 This  also  found  no evidence  of
significant  repression  of  inflation  over  the  medium  term.
The  result  on  the  overall  inflation  rate  is,  however,  consistent  with
selected  prices  or groups  of prices  being held down.  As Figure II.3
indicates,  there  has  been  a divergence  between  inflation  for  the  low  and  high
income  households  in  many  years. Zimbabwe,  like  many  countries,  has  tighter
controls  over  the  prices  of  selected  wage  goods  and  public  services.  However,
u.nlike  some  others,  period.  of  suppression  of  price  rises  have  been  followed
by significant  increases--the  overall  low  income  index  has risen  above  the
high  income  index  since  1982.  This  is further  explored  in  section  III  for
foods  and  services--the  two  cases  where  policy  interventions  have  driven  a
wedge  between  price  changes  for  the  two  indices  (see  Figures  III.3  and  4).
Econometric  results  presented  in Section  III  confirm  that  the  effects  of
policy  intervention  is  to  change  the  rate  of  increase  of  the  low  income  index,
not  the  high  income  index. At least  until  the  price  freeze  imposed  in  mid-
1987, the high income  index is probably  a reasonably  good measure  of
underlying  consumer  inflation  in  the  economy.
The  next  set  of  figur4s  compares  consumer  inflation  with  the  level  of
economic  activity  and the  budget  deficit. Figure  II.4  reveals  a roughly
contracyclical  relationship  between  growth  in  output  and  inflation--years  of
output  recovery  have  been  associated  with  relatively  lower  inflation  and  vice
versa.  Figure  11.5  shows  the absence  of any simple  correlation  between
l.  This  essentially  assesses  whether  there  is  an inconsistency  between  the
observed  growth  in  money  holdings  and  a  reasonable  money  demand  function-
-see  Feltenstein  and  Ha  Jimin  (1988).-10-
Fiaure  11.4
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inflation  and the  budget  deficit,  especially  during  the  sharp  acceleration  of
inflation in the early 1980s.  At the beginning  of the 1980s and in the
1985-86  period,  there  is some coincidence  in the  directions  of movement,  but
the  overall  picture  is that  inflation  has moved  up and down  while  the  deficit
has remained  consistently  high  by international  standards,  at 9-11  percent  of
GDP.  This is largely  a consequence  of the way in which the Government  has
effected  macroeconomic  adjustment  and the  relatively  well-developed  nature  of
the  financial  system  which is used to finance  the  high  budget  deficit--these
are  reviewed  in the  following  subsections.
Finally,  Figures  II.6  and  7 summarize  the  history  on  wages. 6 There  is
a  long-run  trend  of a gentle  rise in the real wage that is roughly  in line
with  the  growth  in  the  average  productivity  of the  formal  labor  force.  This  is
broken  in the  immediate  post-independence  period  when significant  rises  in the
minimum  wage  pushed  nominal  wage growth  way  above  consumer  inflation,  leading
to a relatively large growth in real wages (especially  for agricultural
workers, the lowest-paid group  in the formal employment). This proved
unsustainable  and subsequent  nominal  wage grou.h  has  been  held below  consumer
inflation,  such that  by the  mid-1980s  real  wages  had adjusted  back to their
long-run  trend  position.  However,  the  figures  indicate  an apparent  passthrough
of the 1980-81  wage increases  into  consumer  inflation  with a lag of about  a
year.  Econometric  results  confirming  these  conclusions  are given in Section
III.
i/  This uses average  earnings  information  as the best available  proxy for
wage  rates.-12-
Figure  11.6
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B.  Macroeconomic  Adiustment  Mechanisms
A brief  account  of the  nature  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  in  Zimbabwe
is  necessary  to understand  the  price-setting  process  and the  inflation  story.
The dominant factor in arranging  macroeconomic  balance is the system of
administered  allocation  of foreign  exchange. This applies  to virtually  all
uses of foreign  exchange  in the country,  including  both capital  and current
transactions.  it has two  broad  effects:  first,  it closes  the  capital  account
and  thereby insulates the domestic financial system from international
financial  developments;  second,  it determines  both the level  and composition
of imports. While some illegal  transactions  are reported,  bvth in terms  of
black  market  sales  of foreign  exchange  (at  a foreign  exchange  premium  of the
order of 100 percent)  and transfer  pricing  by multinationals,  these  do not
appear  to have a major  influence  either  on domestic  financial  developments  or
product  markets.  This is not to say, of course,  that Zimbabwe  is running  a
uniquely  water-tight  economy,  or that  these  illegal  outflows  have not  been of
quantitative  significance.  But  controls  are sufficiently  effective  to have  a
radical  influence  on domestic  savings  investment  balances,  and, unlike  many
countries,  product  market  prices  are by and large  influenced  by the official
exchange  rate  and  markups  on that,  and  not  the  parallel  market  rate.
The controls on the capital account apply both to outflows and
inflows  of capital.  At independence  the Government  inherited  a position  of
sizable holdings  of  domestic  assets  owned  by  foreign  companies  and
individuals. These assets  were largely  held in the form of either  blocked
financial  assets 7 or equity  holdings in firms in the productive  sectors,
./ These  are only blocked  from  expatriation;  they form  part of the  domestic
money  supply  or other  domestic  financial  assets.-14-
especially  in mining,  manufacturing  and estate  agriculture. Two principal
options have emerged for expatriation  of these assets.  First,  firms and
individuals  can purchase  government  convertible  bonds  with a maturity  of 12
and 20 years respectively. Since  these  are denominated  in Zimbabwe  dollars
and bear an interest  rate of five percent,  there is a significant  implicit
capital  loss in foreign  exchange  terms--the  fact  that  most owners  of blocked
funds  chose  to take this  option  when it  became  available  in 1984 is evidence
that the  cost of illegal  capital  outflows  is high.  Second,  since  about  mid-
1987,  the  Government  has been  allowing  repatriation  of funds  in a one to two-
year period to foreign  firms who disinvest  under certain conditions,  that
includes  a discount  on  book  values  of 70 percent  or  more.  With  respect  to  new
inflows,  there  are  strict  controls  on both  new  foreign  investments  and  foreign
borrowing,  that  are  enforced  through  a committee  system  of approval.
The  dominant  effect  of capital  account  controls  is  to  keep  savings  in
the country.  Current  account  controls  directly  complement  these  within  the
overall objective of maintaining  short-run  external  balance:  the level of
affordable  imports  is set for  each six-month  period  on the  basis  of forecast
exports,  capital  flows  and desired  net reserve  movements. While  the  primary
focus is on external  balance, this is also the principal determinant  of
internal  balance, since the availability  of capital goods imports is an
important  determinant  of inwestment  activity,  while imports  of intermediates
have a major influence on output in the import-dependent  sectors.  This
obviously  influences  the  pattern  of consumption  and  probably  also influences
the  consumption  level  of higher  income  households.-15-
The management  of foreign  exchange  allocations  provides  the core of
the  explanation  of the coexistence  of large  budget  deficits  without  apparent
indications  of internal  instability  (whether  in the inflation  rate or in the
monetary  system). Current  account  deficits  of the  order  of 12 percent  of GDP
emerged  in 1981-82.  These  were reduced  to close  to zero  by 1986-87  largely
through  reductions  in imports,  though  measures  to  encourage  exports,  including
a real effective depreciation of about 25 percent also played a  role.
Cutbacks in private expenditures  were largely effected  by reduced import
allocations  to achieve  broad  consistency  with the  budget  deficit  and  available
foreign  savings. The net effect  was to foster  a net  private  savings  rate  of
the  order  of 10 percent  of GDP in the  mid-1980s  compared  with less  than five
percent  in 1981-82  that substituted  for  the significant  reduction  of foreign
financing  of the  deficit. Exchange  rate,  monetary  and  wage and price  policy
played  an important,  but essentially  subsidiary  role.
C.  Price  and  Wage  Determination
The Government  operates  a quite comprehensive  system  of price and
wage determination  for the public  and private sectors.  The price control
system  dates  back to the formation  of the foreign  exchange  allocation  system
and can be viewed  as directly  complementary  to this.  A major  microeconomic
objective  is to prevent  firms  from  obtaining  excess  profits  as a consequences
of the shortages created by ioreign exchange rationing,  while the main
macroeconomic  objective  is to support  greater  price  stability.  Minimum  wages
were also established  prior to independence,  but the extent of government
influence  on  wages  increased  substantially  during  the  1980s.-16-
The price control  system  can  be subdivided  into two parts.  For a
limited  set  of  products,  the  price  is  set  by the  Government;  these  cover  basic
foods,  including  maize-meal,  bread,  beef  and  milk,  the  producer  prices  for  the
major  agricultural products,8 most  energy  products,  selected other
intermediate  products,  including  cotton  lint, fertilizer  and steel,  and the
prices  of most urban  and transport  services. The  bulk of other  products  are
technically  covered by an allowable mark-up.  For manufacturers  this is
generally  based  on the margins  obtained  in 1981,  while specific  margins  are
set  for  different  levels  of  distribution.  Even  for  the  commodities  subject  to
specific price  control, a major factor behind any price adjustment is
consideration  of cost changes,  though  this is obviously  affected  by other
objectives,  including  the maintenance  of "reasonable"  prices  for wage goods
and the  need to reduce  subsidies  in the  budget. The use  of regulated  prices
to  moderate  overall  inflation  has  not  been  an  explicit  objective,  but  no doubt
also  has  an influence  on  pricing  decisions.
The overall  picture  is thus of a price-setting  process  governed  by
markups,  with a subset  of publicly-determined  prices  adjusting  with a lag (or
occasionally  a lead). Although  prescribed  markups  dominate  in principle,  it
is quite  easy for changes  in demand  pressure  to influence  prices  since  both
manufactures  and  retailers  in  practice  have some  latitude.  An initial  increase
can then  swiftly  pass through  the  system  in line  with  the regulations.  It is
difficult  to obtain  direct evidence  for variations  in markups through  the
t/  The  most important  exception  is tobacco,  that is  dominated  by large-scale
farmers.-17-
cycle,  but indirect  support  is  provided  by the  short-run  shifts  in the  rate  of
change  of  nominal  wages  and  prices. This is  associated  with  variations  in the
share  of profits  in the  economy.
As noted above, a change was  effected in July 1987, when the
Government  imposed  a freeze  on price  and wage adjustments  that in principle
applied  to all products. This price freeze  was largely  a consequence  of an
attempt to hold down recurrent  expenditures  through  avoiding  increases  in
public  wage.  This  was extended  to  private  wages  (that  in  principle,  if  not  in
practice  move together--see  below)  and then to prices.  As Figures  II.8 and
TT.9  show  this  led  to a marked  deceleration  in inflation  for  both the  low  and
high income baskets of goods in the second  half of 1987.  Inflation  was
previously  expected  to be around  15 percent  and there  appears  to have been
some genuine  repression  in the inflation  rate for a while.  The freeze  was
partially  lifted  in early  in 1988,  but only a five percent  nominal  increase
was automatically  approved. The low-income  index  has become  quite  erratic  on
a month-to-month  basis  as it tends  to  be dominated  by specific  increases  of a
limited  number  of goods.  There is some evidence  of a squeeze  in margins  in
poorer  corporate  profits  in the results  reported  in mid-1988,  but there  was
also  reported  to  be evasion  of the  price  freeze. Probably  for  the  first  time,
many observers  became  skeptical  of the pace of price  change  reported  in the
CPI.
Controls  on wage adjustments  have been more comprehensive  than on
prices  (prior  to the  wages and prices  freeze). The Government's  view since
independence  has been that the trade  union movement  has been too weak to
operate  in a collective  bargaining  framework  and the Government  has had to
intervene  to ensure  an adequate  level  of  wages. It  has  also  had the  objective- o  o~  -
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of  narrowing  the  wide  overall  wage  and  salary  differentials  inherited  from  the
pre-independence  racial  divisions. This  has led  both to the  establishment  of
nation-wide minlimum  wages (divided  by three or four broad sectors) and
instructions  on the required  rate of increase  for  different  salary  levels  in
both the  public  and  private  sectors. As discussed  elsewhere, 9 these  policies
initially raised average wages above  their trend level in 1980-81 and
subsequently  held wage increases  below the rate of inflation,  bringing  real
wages back  to about the  trend level by  the mid-1980s.  Narrowing of
differentials  has  been successful  in the  public  sector  but appear  to  have not
been effective  in the  private  sector. There  is some  evidence  for  a cyclical
pattern  of  wages  through  the  business  cycle  bvu,  especially  since
independence,  this has been heavily influenced  by policy intervention--this
will  be important  for  the  analysis  of inflation.
D.  The  Financial  Syste
Zimbabwe's  financial  system  is unusually  deep for a country  of its
income  level. Total  financial  assets  are  equivalent  to almost  120  percent  of
GDP--a comparable relative size to Chile, Philippines  and Venezuela,  and
greater  than Turkey  or Nigeria.  Money co  GDP ratios  are not high and, as
Figure II.10 shows, have experienced some instability in the 1980s.10
However,  the  monetary  banking  sector  is relatively  well-developed  in terms  of
institutions,  including  the  Reserve  Bank  of  Zimbabwe,  two  discount  houses,
2/  See  World  Bank  CEM (1987)  and  Fallon  (1987).
O2/  This paper  has used the  Reserve  Bank's  definition  of broad  money,  which
is relatively  tight,  since  it only includes  time  deposits  up to 30 days
maturity--the  use of broader  definitions  of quasi-money  do not  have any
substantive  effect  on the  results.-20-
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five  commercial  banks  and  accepting  houses. Of equal  importance  is the  extent
of the non-monetary sector,  whose total assets  significantly  exceed  broad
money; it includes  building  societies  (mortgage  companies),  finance  houses,
the post office saving bank, insurance  companies  and pension funds.  The
latter  two groups  of institutional  investors  are quantitatively  of greatest
importance  and have played a major role in capturing  long-term  financial
savings--and  subsequently  lending  much  of them  to the  Government.  The size  of
the insurance companies' assets relative to GDP are roughly  the same as
Australia's  and substantially  more than other developing  countries.  The
relative depth of the financial system is due to two factors:  the well-
developed  formal  sector  and  the  fact  that  after  sanctions  were  imposed  in 1965
there  was a  need to  replicate,  within  the  country,  the  financial  services  that
had  previously  been,  in  part,  provided  from  London.
We saw in Figure  II.10  that  money  has, if anything,  grown  slightly
slower  than  nominal  GDP. Within  this,  currency  has  displayed  both significant
variation  and a slightly  upward  trend,  as illustrated  in Figure  II.11.  The
jump in 1980-81  appears to be explained  by a sharp  discontinuity  in maize
pricing  policy  (in  an excellent  harvest  year)  that encouraged  a sudden  shift
by smallholders  into  marketing  maize  and, In  many  cases,  purchasing  maizemeal.
With the correction  of pricing  anomalies there  was a reversion  to a lower
share of currency in money, but et higirer,  and more monetized  level.  A
further  shift  from  money  to  demand  deposits  or  post  office  savings  accounts  is
also  occurring,  but it is not  clear  when this  process  will outweigh  the  shift
into currency  as parts of the  economy  start  the process  of monetization.  By
contrast,  the  non-monetary  sector  has tended  to grow  both steadily  and faster-22-
than  nominal  GDP, largely  because  of a strong  underlying  growth  in demand  for
life  insurance  and  pension  schemes  and,  until  1988,  buoyant  growth  in the  post
office's  assets  (in  part  due  to the  favored  tax  position  for  deposits  there).
The working of the system is of considerable  importance  to its
treatment in the account of inflation.  Two issues are of importance--
interest  rate determination  and financial  asset substitution. The story  is
complex:  many interest  rates  are technically  uncontrolled,  but display  a highr
degree  of stability  in nominal  terms,  as Figure  II.12  shows.  The rate of
inflation  is the  major  determinant  of changes  in the real  rate in most  years
and  real  deposit  rates  are  often  negative. A number  of controls  underly  this
pattern.  The most important  is the indirect  effect  of  the foreign  exchange
controls that were outlined  above.  These have a major influence  both on
levels  of deposits  by the formal  sector  and on private  sector  credit  demand.
On top of this are measures  designed  to channel  credit  into public  sector
finance,  including  various liquid  asset requirements  that are biased  toward
public debt  instruments,  prescribed  assets ratios for the institutional
investors  (who currently have  to have  60%  of  their asset  in public
liabilities)  and  moral  suasion,  that  is  of  most importance  in the  provision  of
credit  by the commercial  banks to the  Agricultural  Marketing  Autholity. If
the pattern of directed credit and net private credit demand (largely
determined  by the foreign  exchange  allocation  system)  shows  signs of being
inconsistent  with nominal interest  rate stability,  the monetary  authorities
take additional measures, the most important of which are equivalent  to
variations  in required  reserve  ratios,  to restore  this.  As an abstraction,
this is  best characterized  in terms  of interest  rates  being  policy-determined
and not endogenous--with  the exception  of one or two episodes  in 1982 and
1984,  the  closure  of the  system  has  clearly  lain  completely  elsewhere.-23-
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With respect  to substitution  amongst  financial  assets,  the dominant
pattern appears to be of the structure  of assets  being determined  by the
sharply  differing  characteristics  of the  assets--especially  between  assets  in
the  monetary  and  non-monetary  system. Changes  in asset  distribution  appear  to
be affected  by structural  factors  rather  than  relative  interest  rates. There
are exceptions  to this:  in particular  the tax-free  character  of interest  on
deposits  in the  post office  attracted  deposits  from  commercial  banks  and the
building  societies  in the  early  and mid-1980s.  However,  there are
restrictions  on the  size  of these  deposits  and  the  most important  shifts  (with
the  building  societies)  lie within  the  non-monetary  sector  and  have largely
been managed  by the Government  in terms  of this  particular  relative  return.
Overall,  we have  used  as an initial  characterization  a picture  in  which  shifts
between  money  and  non-monetary  financial  assets  are  not endogenous  for  short-
run macroeconomic adjustment, thus allowirng  the monetary dimensions  of
inflation  to be captured  in terms  of a simple  money  demand  function. This is
an area  that  will  be explored  further.
The  non-monetary  sector  is,  however,  central  to the  budgetary  finance
story.  The central  government  deficits  that  were shown in Figure  II.5  have
been largely  financed  without recourse  to financing  from the Reserve Bank.
Foreign  finance  played  an important  role  in the  early  1980s,  but  this  has  been
largely replaced  by domestic  purchases  of medium and long-term  government
bonds (called  government  "stock"  in Zimbabwe). This  has often  been at low  or
negative  real interest  rates  but despite  this there  has been a significant
rise in the share  of central  government  debt in GDP, as Figure  II.13  shows.
The institutional  investors  and the post office  have played  a major role in
this.  While both are heavily influenced by  government regulations  or-25-
directions,  it should  again  be emphasized  that  the  net private  saving  surplus
generated  by the foreign  exchange  allocation  system  has its counterpart  in
strong  demand  for  any public  debt instruments  and an underlying  liquidity  in
the monetary system.  The gains in terms  of reduced  pressures  of deficit
finance  on inflation  are likely  to  be temporary  unless  the  surplus  were to  be
sustained  and  real  interest  rate  to  be kept  low.
E.  Current  Issues
Issues  of inflation  are  closely  interwoven  with the  major issues  in
macroeconomic  management  in  Zimbabwe. The  following  are  some  of the  principal
areas  of concern.
Mi)  The  fiscal deficit has been  financed in a  largely non-
inflationary  manner  to date--how  long  is  this  sustainable?  Budget  speeches  in
the past two years  have emphasized  the high potential  cost of any need to
shift  to deficit  finance  through  use of the overdraft  with the Reserve  Bank
and also a keen awarAness  of the cumulative  effects  of the growing  interest
rate  bill.
(ii)  Within  the existing system the Government is continually
making  decisions  over the  exchange  rate,  regulated  prices  and,  once  a year  on
wages.  There is a general perception  that these can have cost-push,  or
dampening  effects,  on the  rate  of inflation,  but the  relative  weight  given  to
this and other factors  has varied  substantially  from year to year and for
decisions  over  different  prices  in the  same  year.
(iii) The Government  initiated  the process  of unwinding  the  price
freeze  in  1988  but is  now  uncertain  where  to  go  next  with  uncertainty  over  the
extent  of pent-up  inflation--and  how  to  manage  it--the  key  problem. What  is  a-26-
reasonable  approach  to managing  this  decontrol and  then effecting a
disinflationary  process and what target for the exchange  rate, money and
regulated  prices  would  be appropriate  to  complement  the  decontrol?
(iv)  What would be the consequence for the interrelationship
between  macroeconomic  adjustment  and inflation  in the event of a shift in
policy regime i.e. a reduction in the quantitative  direction of foreign
exchange?-27-
III: 3E  MODEL
While the  model  as spelt  out in this section  appears  fairly  complex
its  reduced-form  structure  is quite  straightforward,  and  can  be summarized  in
three  simplified  equations.
P  - f (M,  Y, e, Pf,  Zl)  *--(1)
M - f (e,  P,  Z2)  ...  (2)
Y - f (e.Pf/P,  Z3)  ...  (3)
Equation (1), which will be derived later,  states that prices (P) are a
function  of money (M),  output  (Y),  the  exchange  rate (e),  foreign  prices  (Pf)
and other cost-push  elements  (Zl).  Monetary  growth (equation  (2)) in turn
depends  on prices  and  the  exchange  rate through  the  impact  of these  prices  on
the  fiscal  deficit. The  endogenized  fiscal  deficit  is  therefore  one  mechanism
through  which  prices  and the  exchange  rate  affect  monetary  growth. The other
mechanism  is through  nominal  wage adjustments  which are then  accommodated  by
the  monetary  authorities.  Monetary  policy  and  other  influences  on the  deficit
also affect the rate of monetization  and are represented  by Z2. Finally,
,equation  (3)  has real output  as a  positive  function  of the  real  exchange  rate
and  other  constraints  represented  by Z3. This is,  of course,  a simplification
of a more complex  pattern of output determination. If output is supply-
constrained,  an increase  in the  real  exchange  rate (real  depreciation)  should
increase  exports  and the  country's  importing  capacity  leading  to an increase
in output.  In a demand-determined  model,  the same  result  holds;  exports  (X)
rise  and imports  (M)  fall  as the  real  exchange  rate  depreciates;  (X-M)  rises.
This basic structure  allows  us, for  example,  to examine  three  routes  through
which exchange  rate  changes  affect  inflation: first,  through  a direct  cost--28-
push  effect  on  prices;  second,  through  its  impact  of the  various  components  of
the  budget,  that  in  turn  affects  inflation  through  monetary  channels  depending
on how the budget is financed;  third, through  the influence  on the trade
balance  and  real  output.
The detailed  model is described  in three  parts  which expand  on the
three  basic  reduced-form  equations  we have listed: in  Section  III.A  we derive
and present  estimates  of the overall inflation  equation.  This involves  a
discussion  of different  factors  which affect  inflation  in Zimbabwe:  import
prices,  wage-induced  inflation  and  changes  in  administered  prices. In  Section
III.B  we describe  the  equations  which  capture  the  monetary  and  fiscal  systems.
These  include  the  effects  of  how  changes  in individual  prices  affect  different
components  of the budget.  It also includes  equations  and identities  which
describe  how fiscal  deficits  translate  into money creation  which then feed
back into  inflation. Section  III.C  describes  the  real  side interactions  that
are  included  in the  model.
A.  Inflation.  Wage.  Monetary  Interactions
(i)  The  Inflation  Equation
The overall  inflation  equation  is derived  using a combination  of a
monetarist  and  a mark-up  model.  We distinguish  between  three  types  of goods:
traded  (p1).  non-traded  without  specific  controls  (P2)  and  those  with  controls
(p3).  In Zimbabwe  very few  commodities  would  come  under  the first  category.
Very few final  products  are imported  and almost  all are subject  to domestic
mark-ups. The  overall  rate  of inflation  (p)  is a  weighted  average  of the  rate
of inflation  in  the  three  categories.
P  - Al(Pl)  +  A 2(P2)  +  (l-Al-X 2)P3 ...  (4)-29-
Let us for  the moment ignore controlled commodities.  We will
reintroduce  them  into  the  analysis  later.
If there  is  free  trade,  then  the  change  in  domestic  goods  prices  will
equal the change  in foreign  prices  plus the change  in the nominal  exchange
rate,  (Corbo  and  McNelis  (1987)).
P1 - Pf  +  e  (5)
where Pl  represents  the rate of change  in prices  for commodities  that are
freely  traded.
For commodities  with quantitative  restrictions  and non-tradeables,
prices  will  be determined  through  a mark-up  over  unit  labor  costs  (*p)  and  the
cost of imported materials (i*c)  (Bruno (1979), Gordon (1975) and Corbo
(1985)).  The degree  of mark-up  will  depend  on demand  pressures  in the  economy
(ED). The  change  in  unit  labor  cost is  defined  as the  difference  between  wage
growth and productivity  growth in the economy.  The chan&g in P2 can be
captured  by the  following  equation.
P2  - a.  *p +  a2 itc  +  a3 ED  ...  (6)
al+a2  <1 ,  a3  >0
Following  Corbo  and  McNelis  (1987)  we assume  that:
*c - pf  +  e
Inserting  Equations  5 and 6 into  4 (and  ignoring  P3 for the  moment)
we get  a reduced  form  equation  for  overall  inflation.
P - alA 2*P +  (Al+A 2a2)(6+Pf)  +  a3X2ED  ...  (7)
As can be seen,  the  fact that X1 is close  to zero for  Zimbabwe  does
not  affect  the  structure  of the  model.
To apply  this  model  to  empirical  data  for  Zimbabwe  we have to specify
the  change  in excess  demand  (ED)  and the  change  in  unit labour  costs  (*p).  In
developed  countries  information  on  labour productivity  and  capacity-30-
utilization  are  readily  available. 11 However  in most  developing  countries 12
among  them  Zimbabwe,  time-series  data  on these  variables  are  not available  and
an alternative  approach  is  necessary.
(ii) SRecifyinn  Excess  Demand
Using  Walras  Law  we assume  that  excess  demand  in the  goods  market  is
equivalentl 3 to excess  supply  in the  money  market. Although  substitution  is
possible  between  money  and alternative  financial  assets  we follow  Khan (1980)
who  argues  that  the  substitution  between  money  and  goods  is  quantitatively  far
more important  becstuse  of the relatively  under-developed  nature  of financial
markets in developing countries.  Moreover, the problem is compounded  by
government  controls  on interest  rates  and  financial  assets  that  are  available.
Although Zimbabwe's financial markets are relatively  better developed  in
comparison  with other  African  countries,  as a first  approximation  we assume
that  shift  between  money  and financial  assets  derive  from  government  controls
and long-run  trends  in the  economy,  and is  not an endogenous  factor  in short-
run adjustment  (see Section  II).  This indicates  that the characterization
suggested  by  Khan is  applicable  in this  case.
jj/  See for example  Gressani,  Guiso  and Visco (1988)  for an application  of
this  type  of mark-up  model  for  Italy.
j2/  With some  exceptions,  see  Corbo  and  McNelis  (1987)  for  an application  to
Korea,  Israel  and Chile.  However,  their  study  was for  the manufacturing
sector  only and even so used the difference  between  money and output
growth  to  define  excess  demand.
13/  An excess  demand  variable  was  cr!Lbtructed  taking  the  differential  between
actual  and trend  GDP but gave very poor results.  Similar  results  were
obtained  for over 30 countries  using data for 1956-72  by S.S. Bhalla
(1981).-31-
We specify  excess  money supply  as the log difference  of real  money
supply  to real  money  demand.
ED - log (M/p) - log (Md/p)  ...  (8)
This  can  be written  as:
Mt - pt +  log (M(t-l)/p(t-1))  - log (Md(t)/p(t))  ...  (9)
where  M(t) is  changes  in  the  supply  of  money  and  md(t)  is  money  demand  in  log
form.
The  money  demand  function  is  formulated  in  a standard  manner.
log(Md/p)  - dO +  dl log(y) +  d2 i +  d3 pe  ..  .(10)
where dl >  0, d2 <  0 and d3 <  0
y is real income, i is the deposit interest  rate and pe is the
expectation  on inflation. 14 Substituting  10 into  9  we get
ED - log (Mt/p(t-l)) - Pt  - (d,+dl log y +  d2i +  d3pe)  ...  (11)
Substituting  Equation  11 into 7 gives the following  reduced  form
inflation  equation. 15
p  - bo +  b, (*p)  +  b2(&+Pf) +  b3 log  (Mt/pt-1)
+  b4 log y +  b5 i +  b6 pe  ... (12)
1I/  We used  M2 which  is defined  as currency  plus  demand  deposits  plus 30-day
time  deposits. The  interest  rate  used  is the  3-month  deposit  rate.
15/ Instead of substituting  the excess money supply into the inflation
equation  and  then  estimating  the  reduced  form,  an alternative  approach  is
to calculate  excess  money supply  as the difference  between  money and
predicted money demand.  This is now being explored  and preliminary
results  are  encouraging.-32-
where  bl  - (alA 2/x);  b2 - (Al+A 2a2)/x;  b3 - a3A 2/x;  b4 - -A 2a3dl/x;
b5 - -A 2a3d2/x; b6 - - a3X2d3/x; x - l+a 3A2kl
0O!b<l,  O<b2<1,  O<b3sl1,  b4<0,  b5>0,  b6>0.
Three alternatives are considered for specifying the expected
inflation  term in the  model.  Under the  first,  assuming  rational  expectations
or  perfect  foresight  (Muth,  1974,  Bruno,  1978)
pe(t)  - p(t)+n(t)  ...  (13)
where  n(t)  is uncorrelated  with  pe(t)
In  this  case  Equation  12 simply  transforms  into
Pt  - CO  +  Cl(*p)  +  C2(6+Pf)  +  C3 log  (Mt/pt-1)
+  C4 log  (y)  +  C5 i  ...  (14)
where  Z - 1 +  a3A2d3 >  0; Ci  - bi/Z  and  the  expected  signs  of  Ci are  the  same
(x)
as of  bi
An alternative  approach  is to  use  lagged  inflation  p(t-l)
as an indicator  of expected  inflation. A third  uses Cagan's  (1956)  adaptive
expectations  mechanism  where:
pe  -_  . p
1-i7.L
where e  is the adaptive  expectations  coefficient  and L is a Lag Operator.
These three formulations  were tested  against  each other.  Both the use of
lagged  inflation  and  adaptive  expectations  performed  poorly  in  comparison  with
the rational  expectations  formulation  . The test results  are presented  in
Appendix  1.-33-
(iii) Wage-Induced  Inflation
Finally  we  need to specify  the  change  in  unit  labour  costs  (*p)  which
is defined  as the difference  between  real wages  and labor  productivity. In
Zimbabwe  accurate  data  on labor  productivity  are  not readily  available  and  we
therefore  estimated  the  change  in  unit  labour  costs  by first  estimating  a real
wage  equation  for  Zimbabwe  as follows.
Real  wages  adjust  to  their  desired  level  with  an adjustment  lag  4.
*-p  - 4  (log(wd/p)-(log  w(t-l)/p(t-l)))  ...  (15)
where  0  < 0  <  1
wd(t)  is  the  desired  level  of  wages  in  year  t.
log (wd/p)  - ko +  kl t  + k2D  ...  (16)
The desired real wage is a function  of productivity  growth  which
follows  a time trend.  The long-run  trend in real wages follows  this path
quite  accurately  (see Figure  III.1)  in the case of Zimbabwe  except  for the
period  of government  interventions  in  the  labour  market  following  independence
in 1980-83. The  1980  wage  hike raised  labor  compensations  beyond  productivity
increases in an autonomous effort by the government to improve income
distribution. The increase  could  not  be sustained  and  real  wages started  to
fall  in 1983.  A dummy  variable  (D)  was  used to account  for  this  administered
increase  in  wages  in the  period  1980-83
The  estimated  change  in  real  wage  equation  is:
*(t)-P(t)  - 0  *  kO  + 0  - kl  *  t - 4 (log(w/p)t-l)  + Ok2D  ...  (17)
Empirical  results  for  the  period  1968-85  are  as follows.
w-p  - -0.5222  + 0.0181  t - -1.0125  log(w/p)t-l  + 0.1445  D
(2.51)  (4.00)  (5.20)  (4.98)
R2  - 0.65
D.W.  - 2.34-34-
Figure  111.1
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The equation  results  show that the desired  rate of increase  in real
wages (kl)  is  about  1.8  percent  per  annum  and  all  of this  increase  is  actually
attained in one year (0-1.01).  The coefficient  of the dummy variable  is
highly  significant  showing  that on average  real wages  exceeded  productivity
increases  by 14 percent  in 1980-83.  Equation  17 can be used to determine
changes in unit labor costs i.e. wage increases  which exceed  productivity
growth.  In the case of Zimbabwe  these  are mostly  caused  by government  wage
policy  as the degree  of unionization  is low (as discussed  in Section  II).
This  residual  component  of wage inflation  (*p)  which  is  used as our indicator
for  changes  in  unit labor  costs  can  then  be calculated  as
*p(t)  - *(t)  - *kO  - $kl  t  +  0(log(w/p)t-l)  ...  (18)
(iv) Estimates  of the  Overall  Inflation  Eguation
The inflation  equation  estimated  with TSLS for  the period  1969-1986
using annual  data is presented  in Table  III.1.  The  model  explains  inflation
in Zimbabwe  very  well (see  Equation  III.1.1). The  adjusted  R2 is  0.79  and  the
coefficients  all have the correct  signs  as well as high t-statistics. The
first round impact  of imported  prices  on domestic  inflation  is fairly  low:
its coefficient has  a value of 0.14 but  is highly significant.  The
coefficient  for changes  in unit labor  costs (0p) is also  highly  significant
and  has  a  value  of  0.35.
It is possible  to derive  some of the parameters  of the structural
equations  such  as those  for  the  money  demand  function.
dl-  - C4
C3
where  dl is the  income  elasticity  of real  money  demand. The  derived  values  of
dl is  1.33.TABLE  111.1:  Inflation  Equations:  TSLS
(1969-86)
Equation  Constant  O+*P  wp  log(U/P_ 1)  log y  I  C  Cs  R2  D.W.
III.1.1. Over-all
Inflation  0.6812  0.1402  0.8438  0.0818  -0.1462  0.88  0.79  1.99 ()O  (1.55)  (2.42)  (2.56)  (1.94)  (2.21)  (3.42)
I11.1.2.  5  0.4084  0.0996  0.2760  0.1161  -0.1430  0.59  -0.5078  0.89  1.69
(1.84)  (2.28)  (2.74)  (3.62)  (2.98)  (8.12)  (3.40)
III.1.8.  p  0.7159  0.0828  0.8119  0.1058  -0.1704  0.98  -0.2651  0.87  2.44
(2.28)  (1.66)  (2.92)  (3.10)  (3.32)  (4.92)  (2.83)
III.1.4.  p  0.S10  0.0761  0.2786  0.1213  -0.1819  0.78  -0.8713  -0.1584  0.91  2.46  8
(1.83)  (1.83)  (8.01)  (4.15)  (8.62)  (3.86)  (2.38)  (1-76)
All  Equations  wero  *etiates  with  two  stOg least  square,  using  TSP.  The  lnstrum  nt.  used  were  change  In  import  prices,  lagged nominal
interest  rates,  lagged real  mony balances,  lagged mony growth,  lagged Inflation,  1a99ed  log GOP,  fiscal  deficit  as a share  of  CDP,  Cf,
C.  and  the  lagged  difference  betwoen  real  wnges  and productivity  growth.
e  + Pf = Change  in  import  prices  In  Zimbabwe  S
M/P_j 1 a  2  deflated  by  lagged  CPI
y  a  e  I  CDP
I  a s-month  deposit  Interest  rate
Cf  = difference  between  food  inflatton  for  low  Income  versus  high  incoeo
C5 a  difference  bet  won  service  inflation  for  low  income  vorsus  high  Inflation
wp  *  change  in  unit  labor  costTABLE  III.2: Inflation:  Low  and High  Incom
(1969-98)
Equation  Constant  *pf  wp  logQd/P_ 1)  log y  I  Cf  co  R2  0.W.
III.2.1.  Low Income  0.4118  0.0929  0.1473  0.1489  -0.1l96  0.83  -o.6506  -0.3443  0.89  2.83
PL  (1.09)  (1.66)  (1.21)  (3.76)  (2.62)  (3.28)  (3.11)  (2.86)
111.2.2.  PL  0.2344  0.0786  0.1665  -0.1622  0.86  -0.6989  -0.34S8  0.88  2.86
(0.66)  (1.40)  (4.46)  (2.04)  (3.28)  (3.33)  (2.80)
III.2.3.  High  Income  0.6185  0.0593  0.3912  0.0964  -0.1541  0.64  -0.0962  -0.0214  0.89  2.19
PH  (2.15)  (1.40)  (4.25)  (3.25)  (3-89)  (8.33)  (0.61)  (0.23)
111.2.4.  PH  0.6636  0.0624  0.4019  0.0918  -0.1571  0.70  0.90  2.23
(2.63)  (1.74)  (4.79)  (3.15)  (8.82)  (4.66)
All  Equations  were estimates  with  two setg  least  square,  using  TSP.  Tho  instrument  used  were  change  in  import  prices,  nominal  interest  rates,
lagged  real  money  balances,  lgged  money  growth,  laged  inflation,  lagge  log  1  P,  fiscal  deficit  as  a  share  of  COP,  Cf,  Cs  a.d  the  difference
between  wages and  productivity  growth.
:  +  f=  Change in  Import  prices  In  Zimbabwe 3
U/P_. 1 =  2  deflated  by  lagged CPI
y  roal  CDP
I  = 6-month  deposit  Interest  rate
Cf  =  difference  betwoen food  inflation  for  low  income  versus  high  Income
Cs  =  differenc  betwaen service  Inflation  for  low  lncome  verus  high  inflation
wp  *  change  in  unit  labor  cost-38-
The coefficients  of the  structural  equation  cannot  be identified.  If
we assume that there are no freely traded  goods, an assumption  which is
probably  accurate  for  Zimbabwe  as  very few  goods  follow  the  law  of one  price,
and  for  the  moment  ignoring  controlled  commodities  then
A 1 - 0,  A 2 - 1,  A 3 - 0
It is now possible to derive the parameters  of the structural  equations.
These  are
al - 0.58,  a2 - 0.16
T'his  shows  that  the  average  mark-up  has  been  of the  order  of 26%  in Zimbabwe.
(v)  Food  and  Public  Service  Prices
The  model  was first  estimated  assuming  P3 - 0, namely  there  were  no
commodities  under  price controls.  In Zimbabwe  one important  source  of such
price  changes  could  come  from  changes  in  administered  prices. As discussed  in
Section  II, these controls  largely  apply to commodities  in the consumption
basket  of low income  consumers. The  Government  sets  the  price  at which  most
farm  products  are  purchased  from  domestic  producers  and sold to consumers  by
several  state  marketing  boards.  The Government  also regulates  the  prices  of
goods  and  services  such as  fuel and electricity, housing and public
transportation. The losses  of the parastatals  providing  these  services  are
covered  by subsidies  from  the  Government.
Price regulations  affect some sectors of the economy more than
others. In the  case  of Zimbabwe,  the  sectors  that  are  more  directly  affected
by price intervention  are foodstuffs  and services  for low-income  consumers.
The  price indices  for  high and low income  consumers  are presented  in Figures-39-
III.3  and  III.4  for food  and  public  services. The  difference  in  high  and  low
income  inflation  for  these  commodities  is  entirely  due  to the  effect  of direct
price  intervention,  or  an incomes  policy.
cf - lThf  - plf  ...  (19)
Cs - fhs  - 1ls  ... (20)
If the government  imposen  price controls  on commodities  which are
consumed  by the poor cf and cs will be positive.  When these  prices are
adjusted  to  reduce  subsidies,  as  happened  for  food  items  after  1982  and  public
services  after  1984,  cf and  cs  will  be negative. The coefficient  of  cf and  cs
in the  inflation  equation  would  be expected  to  be negative,  because  with  price
controls  cf and  cs rise  leading  to  a decline  in inflation.
The inflation equation  was re-estimated  with cf and cs and the
results are reported in Table III.1 (Equations  III.1.2 - III.1.4).  Both
variables  have the  correct  signs  and  have  high t-statistics.  The coefficient
of the import  price  variable  is reduced  significantly  - from  0.14 to 0.08 -
when cf and cs are added into the equation.  This is important  because  it
confirms  that the impact  of import  prices  on domestic  inflation  depends  to a
large  extent  on the pass-through. If imported  food on fuel or fertilizer
prices are not  passed through automatically,  then their impact will be
reduced.
In order to confirm  our hypothesis  that  price controls  affect  only
the low income  CPI we estimated  separate  inflation  equations  for the low-
income  population  and the  high-income  population. The results  (Table  III.2)
show clearly  that  the  price  control  variables  cf and cs are  significant  only
in the  inflation  equations  for the low-income  population  (Equation  III.2.1),
but  are completely insignificant in the high income inflation equation
(Equation  III.2.3  and  III.2.4).-40-
Figure  III.3
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Wage-induced  inflation  does not appear  to affect  the low income  CPI
as much as the high income  CPI.  Its coefficient  is insignificant  in the
inflation  equation  for low-income  households. This is to be expected  since
wage-goods prices, namely food and basic service are controlled  by  the
government.  An  increase  in wages which is greater than productivity  has
little  effect  on the  low-income  CPI  because  a large  component  of the  latter  is
administered.
To recapitulate,  inflation  in Zimbabwe  can  be characterized  in terms
of a modified  *mark-up  model,  with excess  demand determining  the degree  of
mark-up.  The excess  demand  can be captured  by excess  money supply  because
quantitatively  the  major substitution  is between  money and goods  rather  than
between  money and  other  financial  assets  as one  would exnect  in a developing
country. Import  prices,  price  controls  on basic  items  such  as food  and  public
services  and changes  in unit labour  costs  measured  as changes  in real wages
over labor productivity are also important and significant  explanatory
variables.
B.  Monetarv-Fiscal  Block
The  monetary  system  is  modelled  in  a standard  way. Money  growth  is  a
function  of the money multiplier  and the growth  of reserve  money,  which in
turn is affected  by the  size  of the  fiscal  deficit  and the  manner  in  which  it
is financed.  The fiscal  block is included  in the model to incorporate  the
effect  of  price  changes  on  various  elements  of  public  expenditure  and  revenue.
On the  revenue  side customs  duties  are a function  of the  exchange  rate.  On
the  expenditure  side  the  model  distinguishes  between  subsidies  (a  function  of
price  controls  on  food  and public  services  (cf and  cs)),  interest
payments--foreign  and domestic,  wage bill (a function  of a wage indexation-42-
rule),  public  investment  and  other  government  expenditure.  Price  controls  in
turn affect either  the governments  subsidy  bill and/or  they may lower the
profitability  of the  private  sector  and  thereby  affect  private  investment  and
output. Wage indexation  is  made a policy  variable  whose  historical  value  can
be determined  econometrically.  The size of the fiscal  deficit  is therefore
the  endogenous  outcome  of policy  variables,  and  of the  government's  decisions
on  price  policy.
(i) Money  Supply
The growth  of broad  money  supply 16 (M)  is the  sum  of the  growth  of
reserve money (R) and changes izl  the money multiplier (11).
M - m  +  R  ...  (21)
The money  multiplier,  defined  as the ratio  of M to R, is plotted  in Figure
III.5,  it  can  be written  as:
m - M/R  - ...  (22)
which  can  be written  as:
m - (C+D)/(C+RR+ER)  ...  (23)
m - (l+c)/(c+r+e)  ...  (24)
where  c is the  ratio  of currency  (C)  to deposits  (D),  r the  ratio  of reserves
(RR) to deposits  and e the ratio  of excess  reserves  (ER)  to deposits.  The
money multiplier  can therefore  change  if any of these ratios  change.  The
government  can affect  the  size  of the  money  multiplier  through  changes  in the
required  reserve  ratios. The  money  multiplier  can  also  vary  with  the  currency
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to deposit ratio (c).  As discussed  in Section II, c has been rising in
Zimbabwe,  so m has  been falling. 17 There  is a sharp  Jump in the  value  of m
in 1978  due to a decline  in the  required  reserve  ratio  followed  by an equally
sharp  drop in 1981  when the  required  reserve  ratio  was raised. The long-run
decline  in the  value  of the  money  multiplier  m can  be verified  statistically
by the  following  equation:
log(m) - 3.6626 - 0.067 t  +  0.6073 DR
(54.57)  (7.98)  (9.07)
1j2  . ,95
D.W.  - 2.48
I/  dm/dc  - (r+e-l)/(c+r+e)  <0:-44-
where t is time and DR is a dummy  for the  period  when the required  reserve
ratio  was  lowered  1978-1980.
Reserve  money is by definition  the sum  of net foreign  assets  (NFA),
government  borrowing  from  the  Reserve  Bank  (COG),  central  bank credit  to  banks
and  other  net  assets. The  last  two  are  called  other  assets  (OA)  in  our  model.
R - COG  +  NFA  +  OA  ... (25)
Government  borrowing  from  the  Reserve  Bank is  last  year's  outstanding
debt  with  the  Reserve  Bank (COG. 1) plus  new  borrowing  from  this  source  (GBB).
COG  - COG. 1 +  GBB  ...  (26)
Borrowing  from the Reserve  Bank is treated  as a residual  financing
item,  after  net  foreign  borrowing  (GFB)  and  non-bank  domestic  borrowing  by the
government  (GDB).
GBB  - GDEF - GFB - GDB  ...  (27)
(ii) The  Fiscal  Deficit  and  Its  Comnonents
As noted  above,  the  deficit  (GDEF)  is endogenised  in the  model.  On
the  revenue  side (GREV),  the  model  distinguishes  between  customs  duty (CUDT),
export  taxes  (EXPT)  and  other  revenue  (GOREV).
GDEF  - GEXP  - GREV  ...  (28)
GREV  - CUDT  +  EXPT  +  GOREV  ...  (29)
Customs  duty (CUDT)  is a function  of import  levels  (IMPQ),  foreign
prices,  tariffs  (tm)  and the  exchange  rate (e). Export  taxes  are similarly  a
function of export levels (EXPQ), the foreign price for exports Px, the
exchange  rate  and  the  export  tax  rate  (tx).
CUDT  - IMPQ.  Pf.  e. tm  ...  (30)
EXPT  - EXPQ.  Px.  e. tx  ...  (31)-45-
Other  government  revenue  is  treated  as a function  of nominal  GNP.  An
adjustment  coefficient  is  introduced  to test  if  revenues  adjust  with a lag. 18
Government  expenditure is decomposed  into the wage bill (WBILL),
subsidies  end transfers  to enterprises  (SUBS)  interest  on foreign  (INTF)  and
domestic  debt (INTD),  public  investment  (GI)  and other  government  expenditure
(GOEXP).
GEXP - WBILL + SUBS + INTD +  INTF + GI  + GOEXP  ... (32)
The  wage  bill is  a function  of average  nominal  wages  (wg)  paid  by the
government.  These are  linked to economy wide wages  (Equation  17) and
government  employment  (Lg).
WBILL  - wg.  Lg  ...  (33)
The interest  on foreigr  debt is a function  of the stock of debt
(FDEBT),  interest  rates  (if)  and  the  exchange  rate.
INTF  - FDEBT.  if.  e  ...  (34)
The stock of foreign  debt owed by the government  increases  by the
extent  of new  foreign  borrowing. 19
FDEBT  - FDEBT- 1 + GFB/e  ...  (35)
16/  See  Tanzi  (1977)  for  introducing  this  concept  and  Aghelvi  and  Khan (1978)
for  its  empirical  verification.  The  test  involves  comparing  the  relative
magnitude  of the adjustment  coefficients  in the two equations. If the
adjustment  coefficient  is larger  in the expenditure  equation  the Tanzi
effect  holds  because  it implies  expenditures  adjust  faster  than  revenues
to inflation.  This is  verified  in  Zimbabwe  later.
2_/  In the  African  context,  the  public  sectors  foreign  borrowing  accounts  for
the  bulk of total  foreign  borrowing.-46-
Interest  payments  on domestic  debt are a function  of the stock of
domestic  debt (DDEBT)  and  the  domestic  interest  rate (i).
INTD - i. DDEBT  ...  (36)
DDEBT - DDEBT-1 +  GDB  ...(37)
Note that unless the country  has an open capital  account  domestic
borrowing increases the domestic interest rate.  If interest rates are
controlled  and credit is allocated increased  government  borrowing  reduces
credit  available  for the private  sector.  Government  investment  is a policy
variable.
Subsidies  (in  real terms)  are a function  of the  differential  between
the growth  of prices in the controlled  sectors  and overall  inflation. The
more  price  controls,  the  higher  the  subsidy. 20
SUBS/p - f[(SUBS/p)-l, (pc-p)]  ...  (38)
Again following  Aghelvi and Khan (1978)  government  expenditure  (in
real terms)  is treated  as a function  of the trend in real GNP, real import
prices  and  an adjustment  lag.
GOEXP/P  - f(Y, (GOEXP/P)- 1, MPI/P)  ...  (39)
The estimated equations  for subsidies  ,  other revenues  and other
government  expenditures  are shown in Table III.4.  The results  confirm  the
existence  of the Tanzi effect  which states  that with higher inflation  the
deficit will rise endogenously,  because revenues  will adjust  slower  than
expenditures  to inflation.  The  adjustment  coefficient  in the  other  expenditure
equation  has a value of 0.77 as against  the revenue  adjustment  coefficient
20/ There is a practical  problem  here because  of the need to distinguish
between implicit end explicit subsidies;  this will be dealt with in
further  work.-47-
Table  III.4: Eguation  for  Real  Subsidy.  Qther  Government
Expenditure  &  Revenue
1973-86
1.  log (SUBS/GDP)  - -0.8322  +  0.6724  log  (SUBS/GDP)-l
(1.76)  (4.02)
1.75  log (IPCFCS)  +  0.1946  DS
(0.98)  (1.28)
R2  - 0.81
D.W. - 1.84
2.  log (GOEXP/P)  - 0.77  +  0.7651  log  (GOEXP/P)-l
(0.30) (6.1)
+  0.0845  log (QGDP)  +  0.4007  log (MPI/P)
(0.22)  (1.74)
+  0.2186 D
(2.78)
R2  - 0.94
D.W. - 3.24
3.  log (GOREV)  - -1.24  +  0.48  log  (GDP)  +  0.61  log (GOREV)-l
(2.2) (2.7)  (4.2)
R2  0  0.99
D.W. - 1.4
SUBS  - Subsidy
GOEXP  - Other  Government  Expenditures
GOREV  - Government  Revenue
QGDP  - GDP in  constant  prices
D  - Dummy  equal  to  1 for  years  1982  and  1983
DS  - Dummy  equal  to  0 upto  1980  and  1 subsequently  for  new  regime
IPCFCS  - Ratio  of Food  and  Service  CPI  High Income  to  Low Income
weighted  by their  shares  in  low  income  CPI.  It  measures  an
index  of  price  controls-48-
whose  value  is only  0.61.  These  results  show  that  other  expenditures  adjust  to
inflation  by 77%  within  the  year,  whereas  r.  -%.nues  adjust  by only about 61%
within  the year, so that in the short  run th- fiscal  deficit  will increase
with  higher  inflation.
C.  The  Real  Side:
The  proposed  framework includes a  few key  real macroeconomic
relationships  in order to allow  for the examination  of the important  trade-
offs  that  are  linked  to the  variables  in  the  pricing  side  of the  model. These
are incorporated  in an admittedly  aggregative  fashion  by including  an export
and  private  investment  function  in the  model.
Export  (EXPQ)  are  made  a function  of the  real  exchange  rate (e.Pf/P)
and  demand  in  the  rest  of the  world  (yw) 21
EXPQ  - f(e.  Pf,  Yw)  ...  (40)
Import  capacity  (IMPQ)  is the  sum  of exports  and  net foreign  inflows
minus  the change  in  net foreign  assets. An alternative  formulation  would  be
to estimate  an import  demand  function  and let the exchange  rate adjust to
equate  imports  and exports  subject  to foreign  borrowing  constraints. But in
Zimbabwe  the former  is a more  accurate  representation  of closure  (see  Section
II).
i_.  For the purpose  of the simulation  exercise  in this paper  we assume  a
short-run  elasticity  of 0.1  and  along  ran  run  elasticity  of 1.  In order
to examine the implications  of a higher supply response  we also run
simulations  with a short  run elasticity  of 0.3.  The actual  estimation
(to  be carried  out)  will distinguish  between  export  destination  e.g.  for
Zimbabwe  - South  Africa  and  the  rest  of the  world.-49-
Capacity  cutput  (ycaP)  is a function  of government  (GI)  and  private
investment  (PI)  and  the  incremental  capital-output  ratio.
ycaP  - k- 1 ((PI+GI)/Y). 1 ...  (41)
where  k represents  the incremental  capital-output  ratio (ICOR). The average
ratio  for  the  1967-86  period  is  k-4.7.
We  assume  that  real  income  is entirely determined by  supply
conditions.  The  major  constraint  to investment  and  capacity  utilization  comes
not from  a lack  of demand  but from  shortages  of foreign  exchange  for  reasons
elaborated  upon in Section  II. Cyclical  increases  in output  generally  result
lower inflation and vice versa suggesting that changes in the level of
economic  activity  are  mostly  due to shifts  in the  aggregate  supply  schedule,
while  aggregate  demand  determines  inflation.
Deviations  from potential output occur, but not as a result of
changes  in  effective  demand,  as in  Keynesian  models.
The  ratio  between  actual  output  (y)  and  capacity  output--the  capacity
utilizatj.on  rate--is  a function  of the  country's  importing  capacity.
y/ycap  - f(IMPQ/ycaP)  ...  (42)
Changes in imported inputs alone account for 56 percent of the
variations  in  the  gap  between  potential  and  actual  output.
log(y/ycap)  - -2.48  +0.40.  log  (qinp)
(4.2)  (4.2)
Sample  1970-83  R2  - 0.56
D.W.  - 1.7
where  qinp is  the  quantity  of intermediate  imports.
Private investment (PI) is a behavioral variable dependent on
expected demand (y), the real interest  rate (r) ,  the country's  capacity
utilization  rate (y/ycaP)  or its  importing  capacity  since  the  latter  is a  key
explanatory  variable  for  capacity  utilization.-50-
In a country like Zimoabwe  where a  substantial  component  of its
capital  goods  are  imported  the  importing  capacity  constraint  also  has  a direct
effect  on private investment besides its effect through the capacity
utilization  variable.
The following  regression  provides  an acceptable  explanation  of the
rate  of investment:
(I/y)t  - -0.15  +  0 .79(I/y)t-l - 0.15rt +  0.55(Q/y)t
(2.9)  (7.4)  (1.8)  (3.8)
R2 - 0.92
D.W. - 1.87, 2SLS
where I/y  is the  ratio  of real investment  to income,  rt is the  real interest
rate relevant  for investment  decisions 22 and Q]y is the aggregate  import-
output  ratio.  To account  for potential  simultaniety  between investment  and
imports,  even  though it is quite clear  in Zimbabwe that  imports are
constrained  by foreign  exchange  availability,  instrumental  variables 23 were
used  on the  import  ratio.
D.  How  the  Model  Works: Some  Trade-offs
The  purpose  of  the model  is to analyze  the  implications of
alternative  mixes of policies  and exogenous  assumptions  on nominal  prices,
wages and the fiscal  deficit.  It involves  a set of simultaneous  equations
with significant  interactions  between  different  parts of the model.  A kev
22/ The commercial  bank overdraft  rate was used after  deflating  by the GDP
deflator.
2/  The instrumental  variables are (I/y)t-l,  rt, Yt-1, the export ratio
(X/y)t  and  the  log  of the  real  price  of investment  goods.-51-
question  concerns  the  approach  to closure  in the  model. At least  two  options
can  be explored. The  first  would  have  a stronger  monetarist  orientation,  with
the model essentially  closing  in the  pace of change  in uncontrolled  prices.
The  second would  give greater weight to cost-push influences on both
controlled and uncontrolled  prices and assume an accommodating  monetary
policy. Both general  approaches  would  maintain  the  endogeneity  of the  fiscal
deficit  and the feedback  from  real  variables  into inflation. There  are  also
alternative  closure  options  within the different  parts of the model.  For
example in the external  equation  in the real side of rhe model it may be
plausible  either  to have the  model close  in imports  (which  would  affect  the
model results  via output) or in foreign  borrowing  (which  would affect the
results  via the financing  of deficit). Alternative  approaches  will apply  to
differing  government  practices  and policy  rules; it will  also allow
exploration  of the  robustness  of the  conclusions  over  policy  tradeoffs.
The type of question  the  analysis  will  be used for in Section  IV is
first  illustrated  by exchange  rate  movement. There  are  three  channels  whereby
the exchange  rate influences  inflation.  First there  is a direct  short-run
influence  on the price level.  Second,  the exchange  rate affects  exports,
which  along  with external  borrowing  targets  determines  the  country's  importing
capacity, which affects private investment,  output  and thereby inflation.
This is especially  important  for  many  African  countries).  Third,  devaluation
can increase  or reduce  the  budget  deficit  depending  on  whether  the  Government
(including  its  external  debt  service)  is a net seller  of foreign  exchange  in
the  economy. A related  issue  which  can  be examined  within  this framework  is
how a once off devaluation  compares  with a managed  exchange  rate adjustment-52-
and the extent  and timing  of fiscal  adjustment  that needs to accompany  both
policies.  The trade-off  between  higher  subsidies  to protect the poor from
inflation  and  the  budget  has  already  been  mentioned.
The financing  of the deficit  provides  a second illustration. The
size  of the  financable  fiscal  deficit  depends  on the  way in which  the  fiscal
deficit is financed and on the Government's  expenditure  policy.  If the
Government  is able to  borrow  abroad  or convince  the  public  to  hold Government
bonds at a low interest  rate a larger  fiscal  deficit  is sustainable. 24 The
trade-off  is between  higher inflation  today  versus  higher inflation  in the
future  or higher taxes.  What the Government  spends  on is also important.
Higher  wages to public  sector  employees  can be inflationary  if they exceed
productivity  growth.  A  larger public investment  program need not be if
project selection is based on sound economic criteria that relax output
constraints. 25
To summarize,  the framework  attempts  to go beyond the simple  uni-
directional  model  of monetary  growth  on inflation. Money  supply  and  the  size
of the fiscal  deficit  are endogenous  variables  affected  by the Government's
policies.  In the short and medium term the possibility  that cost-push
factors,  such as taxes, public enterprise  pricing and import prices can
suppress  or accelerate  inflation  and affect  relative  prices  in a significant
manner  is also  recognized.  Output  fluctuations arising from import
2-/  For  a given  level  of  monetary  growth  and inflation.
a/  See Anand, Chhibber  and van Wijnbergen  (1988)  for an illustration  of
these  issues.-53-
constraints  and the possibility  of Government policies affecting  private
investment  and capacity output is explicitly  incorporated  in the model.
Finally,  the impact  of alternative  ways of financing  the fiscal  deficit  and
Government  expenditure  patterns on inflation  are brought in as a central
feature  of the  framework. The gains  of this  approach  lie in the integration
of well-established  relationships  within  a single  framework,  rather  than  new
approaches within  the different parts of the modeling approach.  This
framework  is used to look at certain  policy  issues  to which  we now turn in
Section  IV.-54-
IV:  POLICY  SIMULATIONS
In this section we present three sets of simulations  that are
designed  to illustrate  the implications  of the analysis  of inflation  for the
relationship  between  policy  and future  inflation.  These utilize  the model
described  in  Chapter  III  to  assess  the  consequences  of exchange  rate  movement,
reductions  in food subsidies  and  a shock  to wage and  prices,  due for  example
to  allowing  a swift  unwinding  of a  price  freeze. It  should  be emphasized  that
there  are two different  types  of issue  of importance  in Zimbabwe  (that  are
implicit  in the  questions  raised  at the  end  of Chapter  II).  First,  there  are
the consequences  of changes  within  the system  as it works now--the  exchange
rate and food subsidy  are good extmples  of this.  A model firmly  based on
historical  analysis  is well-suited  to explore  this.  Then there  are  questions
of the implications  of a change  in  policy  regime,  in  particular  one that  both
leads  to a stronger  linkage  between  domestic  tradeable  and  foreign  prices  and
reduced  control  over domestic  prices.  An econometric  model has to be used
with much more caution  here:  with a regime  shift  it would  be expected  that
many coefficients  would  change.  This does not mean the  model  has no value,
however.  In particular,  the  principal  transmission  mechanisms  for  inflation
are likely to remain broadly similar,  in the case of Zimbabwe.  But the
incorporation  of these  channels  into a consistent  model becomes  much more
significant,  i.e. the structural  aspects  of the model  become  more important
than  the  value  of individual  coefficients.  This  means  that  we would  have  less
confidence  over the specific  size of effects  but can still systematically
explore the nature of interactions  and tradeoffs.  The price decontrol
simulation  is one example  of this.  The simulations  developed  for this  paper
are  selective,  of course,  and  further  issues  will  be taken  up in the  future.-55-
A.  Exchange  Rates.  Fiscal  Deficits  and Inflation
One of the most common concerns expressed  by policy  makers over
devaluation  are its inflationary  consequences.  This section  presents  the
results  of simulations  carried  out  with the  model  described  in Section  III  to
study  the overall  impact  and the  different  channels  by which changes  in the
exchange  rate  affect  inflation.
Three  main channels  are  highlighted  in  these  simulations:
1.  Direct Cost-Push:  this is the direct impact  of Increases  in the
domestic  price  of import  prices  on the  overall  price  level.  In the
Zimbabwe  inflation  equation  the  coefficient  of import  price  growth  on
CPI growth  is about  0.08  i.e.  a 1% devaluation  has 0.08  point  first-
round  impact  on CPI  inflation.
2.  Budgetary  Effect: exchange  rate  changes  affect  various  components  of
the budget.  Foreign  debt service  payments  (in domestic  currency)
rise.  At the same time revenues  from customs duties  also rise.
Transfers  and  subsidies  from  the  budget  can  rise  or fall  depending  on
how  much of the  higber  cost  of importing  is passed  on to the  public
enterprises.  Finally,  the  initial  rise  in  overall  prices  affects  the
deficit  if  Government  spending  and  revenues  do  not  adjust
proportionately  (Tanzi  Effect). If expenditures  (as in the case of
Zimbabwe) adjust faster than revenues, the initial impact  is an
increase  in the  budget  deficit.
3.  Real  Side  Effects: if  price  adjustments  to exchange  rate  changes  are
lagged, the real exchange rate would depreciate, providing an
incentive  to exporters. The short-run  elasticity  of real  exports  to
the real exchange rate is assumed to be  0.3 and the long-run-56-
Devaluation.  Inflation  and  Real  Exchange  Rate (RER)
Under Alternative Assumptions
Cumulative  Devaluation  of 27.5%
at the  rate  of 5%  per  annum
Simulation  Inflation  RER  Depreciation
SI:  Real  Exports  to  RER  9%  18.5%
s-run  Elasticity  0.3
1-run  Elasticity  1.0
SII: Real  Exports  to  RER  10%  17.5%
s-run  Elasticity  0.1
1-run  Elasticity  1.0
SIII: Real  Exports  to  RER  16%  11.5%
s-run  Elasticity  0.1
1-run  Elasticity  1.0
50%  of  budget  deficit  financed  by
borrowing  frcm  Central  Bank
(instead  of about  25%  in (i)  and (ii))
SIV:  Real  Exports  to  RER  27.5%  0%
s-run  Elasticity  0.1
1-run  Elasticity  1.0
50%  of budget  deficit  financed  by
borrowing  from  Central  Bank
(instead  of about  25%  in (i)  and (ii))
Slower  revenue  adjustment  to inflation-57-
elasticity  is 1.0  with an adjustment  lag of about  3 years.  If the
economy  is import  constrained  (as  is the  case  in Zimbabwe)  the  higher
export  earnings  would increase  importing  capacity  (assuming  the  same
level of the current account  deficit),  thereby  leading  to higher
growth  in the  economy  which feeds  back into  lower  inflation  for the
same level of monetary expansion.  The elasticity of capacity
utilization  to real  intermediate 26 imports  is  estimated  to  be 0.4.
SI  Gradual  Devaluation:  Crawling  Peg: High  Export  ResRonse
In the first  simulation  the  nominal  exchange  rate is devalued  by 5%
per year over 5  years amounting to a total devaluation  of 27.5%.  The
following  results  are  observed.
- The  overall  price  level  is  higher  by only  9% at the  end  of the  fifth
year  resulting  in  a real  depreciation  of about  18%.
*  The  budget  deficit  is  higher  than  in the  Base  Run  although  by a lower
proportion in the fourth and fifth  year.  The budget deficit  is
higher  because  the  nominal  increases  in expenditure  are  greater  than
the nominal increases  in revenue.  The expenditure  components  that
increase  significantly  are interest  payments  on foreign  debt (up  by
33%),  wage  bill  of the  government  (up  by 9%),  subsidies  and  transfers
(up by 9%) and other government  expenditure  (up by 30%).  This
component  increases  both because  of nominal  CPI import  price  growth
as  well as  real  output  growth.
§/  Any increase  in importing  capacity  is  attributed  proportionally  (based  on
averages  for  1981-85)  to intermediate,  capital  and  consumer  imports.-58-
On the revenue  side  customs  duties  increase  sharply  (up  by 48%)  both
because  the tariff  rates are applied  by a revalued  import  base and
because imports  rise in response  to higher exports.  However,  the
initial  level  of customs  duties  is low  so that the  absolute  increase
in customs duties  is insufficient  to match expenditure  increases.
Other revenues  also rise (up by 10%) but not as rapidly  as other
expenditure  (Tanzi  Effect). 27
Real  exports  are  higher  by about  15%  by the  fifth  year in  response  to
a real  exchange  rate  change  of 21%.  (This  is an average  effect  of a
short  run (one  year)  elasticity  of 0.3 and  a long  run elasticity  of
one.
As a result  real imports  increased  by about the same percent  (16%)
leading  to  an increase  in  output  by 6%  by the  fifth  year,  which  feeds
back into lower inflation.  This translates  into  higher growth  by
over 1% per annum.  Notice  that the assumption  made here is of a
constant current account deficit (net foreign borrowing remains
unchanged). Alternatively,  the level  of foreign  borrowing  could  be
reduced.
In summary  a 27.5%  nominal  devaluation,  spread  over  five  years  leads
to a 9% increase  in  overall  CPI,  18%  real  exchange  rate  depreciation,
15% increase in real exports (and in importing  capacity)  and 6%
increase  in real output.  The level  of real  subsidies  and transfers
is  kept  unchanged.
j7/  This car be corrected by switching to ad valorem taxes,  or by more
periodic  revisions  of non-ad  valorem  taxes,  dutiea  and  fees.-59  -
SII  Gradual  Devaluation:  Crawling  Peg:  Slow  Exoort  Response
*  In SI  we assumed  that  the  short  run  export  elasticity  was  0.3  and  the
long run elasticity was  around 1.0.  The adjustment period is
therefore  a little  over 3 years.  In SII we lower the short run
export  elasticity  to 0.1, leave  the long  run elasticity  at 1.0,  but
assume  an adjustment  period  of 10  years.
*  The  outcome  is  qualitatively  the  same  as in SI.  However  inflation  is
higher  by about 1% point i.e. 10% increase  compared  to 9% in SI.
Real output  increase  is lower  4.5% increase  (compared  to 6% in SI).
Real exports  rise by only 9% by the fifth  year (compared  to 15% in
SI)  and  the  fiscal  deficit  is  even  higher.
This run  should  be regarded  as a conservative  estimate  of the impact
of a devaluation  of 5% per annum.  Yet the benefits are quite
significant,  with growth  higher  by about  0.9% per annum  at the cost
of about  2% higher  inflation  per annum.  Note that the first  round
cost push impact  of a devaluation  of 5% per annum is only about  1%
per annum.  An additional  1% per annum inflation  gets added  on as
other  prices  adjust  upwards  and  monetary  accommodation  takes  place.
SIII  Crawling  Peg:  Slow  Export  ResRonse: Higher  Inflationary  Financing
In SI and SII we assumed  that ti'e  higher fiscal  deficit  would be
financed  through  foreign  borrowing,  domestic  borrowing  and  borrowing  from  the
central  bank (only  the latter  is inflationary  in the short  run) in the same
proportion  as was  observed  historically  in the  period  1981-85. Borrowing  from
the central  bank was on average  about 25% of the fiscal  deficit.  This in
large part explains  the successful  outcome  of devaluations  in SI and SII:
despite  SII  having  a low  export  response.-60-
In this simulation the financing rules were changed  so that 50%
(instead  of 25%)  of the  higher  budget  deficit  was financed  by borrowing  from
the  central  bank.  This is  a more realistic  characterization  of the  financing
choices  available  in other  African  countries  and probably  more realistic  of
the  choice  the  government  of Zimbabwe  is  likely  to  face  in the  future.
The  results  change  quite  dramatically.  Inflation  is  higher;  for  a 5%
nominal  devaluation  over  5 vears  inflation  is  higher  by 3% per annum,  with a
real devaluation of only 2% per annum.  Sixty percent of the nominal
devaluation  gets  eroded  by the  end  of five  years.
SIV  Crawling  Peg:  Slow  ExDort  Resmonse: Higher  Inflationary
Financing: Slower  Revenue  Adiustment
In the  previous  simulation  SIII  we saw  the importance  of the  deficit
financing  rule  in  determining  how  a nominal  devaluation  would  translate  into  a
real devaluation  and inflation.  The speed  with which adjustment  occurs in
fiscal  revenues  is another  key factor.  In particular  it is critical  that
import taxes adjust to fully reflect the more depreciated  exchange rate
changes.  This  is necessary &ecause foreign debt service payments and
government  import  costs  have increased  in direct  proportion  to the nominal
devaluation.  The importance  of these  revenue  adjustments  is  evident  from  this
simulation,  where customs duties  continue  at the old pre-devaluation  base,
with 50%  of the  deficit  financed  by borrowing  from  the  Central  Bank.
The nominal  devaluation  is now completely  eroded  by inflation. By
the  end of year 5, there  is  no real  devaluation  and inflation  accelerates  by
5%  per  annum  in response  to  5%  nominal  devaluation.-61-
SIV represents a  somewhat extreme case of  insufficient fiscal
adjustment  but it demonstrates  the  importance  of consistency  between  exchange
rate changes  and fiscal  adjustments. This coordination  is not automatic  and
requires  wide ranging  fiscal  policy  and  price  changes.
B.  Macro  Effects  of Reduced  Food  Subsidy
The food subsidy  run simulates  the impact  of a 10% increase  in food
prices  to the  low income  population. A more detailed  analysis  of the  subsidy
issue  is  provided  in  a planned  accompanying  paper  (Chhibber  and  Walton,  1989).
This is the  estimated  price  increase  necessary  to  eliminate  the  food  subsidy.
The increase  is spread  over five years  leading  to a catch-up  of food  prices
for  the  low  income  population  with the  high income  population. Full  wage  pass
through  is assumed  with respect  to the  overall  rate of inflation. Therefore
real  wages (measured  as nominal  wages  deflated  by the  overall  CPI)  remains  the
same as in the Base Case.  However  real wages  of the low income  population
fall  as the  low  income  CPI  increases  faster  than  the  overall  CPI.
There  are  two  opposing  influences  on the  overall  price  level. On the
one  hand since  higher  food  prices  (low  income)  are  a component  of the  overall
CPI, the  latter  rises. However,  high food  prices  reduce  budgetary  subsidies.
Other expenditures  remaining  the same, the budget  deficit  is reduced.  The
impact  of the  lower  budget  deficit  on various  macro-targets  depends  very  much
on which  financing  item  is reduced. If the  cuts  are  made from  borrowing  from
external and domestic non-bank sources, the positive  effect of budgetary
reduction  is felt on external  and domestic  debt.  If the  cut is  made through
lower  borrowing  from the central  bank the effect  is deflationary. For the-62-
simulation  run  presented  here 25%  of the  reduction  in the  budget  deficit  from
lower  subsidies  is assumed  to come from reduced  borrowing  from the central
bank.  The  remainder comes from reduced external and domestic non-bank
borrowing.
The  simulation  results  show  the  following:
Inflation is initially higher but as the budget deficit falls
inflation  in the  fourth  and  fifth  year is  lower  than  in  the  base run.
In fact  by the  end  of the  fifth  year the  overall  CPI is  lower  than  in
the  Base  Run.
The reduction in the budget deficit comes from a  fall in food
subsidies.  Food subsidies  are eliminated  by an increase  in food
prices  by 10% for the  low income  population. By the  fifth  year the
reduction  in the  budget  deficit  amounts  to about  22%.
As only 25%  of the reduction  in the  budget  deficit  comes  from lower
borrowing from the central  bank--the  remainder  comes from reduced
external  and domestic  debt.  The cut in both amounts  to a fall in
each  of about  10%  by the  fifth  year.  The  cut  in  the  level  of reserve
money  also  amounts  to a  little  over  10%  by the  fifth  year.
As mentioned  earlier  real  wages  defined  as  nominal  wages  deflated  by
the overall  CPI are  kept constant. However,  real wages  of the low
income  population  fall as low income  CPI increa3es  faster  than  the
overall  CPI.  The fall in real  wages (low  incomes)  amounts  to about
5%  by the  fifth  year.
Transfers  to consumers  also  fall  as the real  subsidy  declines. This
falls  also  amounts  to  about  5%  of the  real  subsidy  level  by the  fifth
year.-63-
These  simulations  show the trade-offs  the Government  faces.  Higher
food subsidies  contribute  to the budget  deficit  but on the whole are not
inflationary  because  of the  manner  in which  the  deficit  is financed. Since,
on average,  about  75% of the  budget  deficit  is financed  through  external  and
domestic  non-bank  borrowing,  the cost of higher subsidies  is paid through
larger debt accumulation.  This in effect postpones inflation.  If this
borrowing  were not feasible,  the impact  of food subsidies  would be highly
inflationary,  contrary  to the general  belief  that food subsidies  help keep
inflation  low.  This outcome  only  comes  about  because  of the  manner  in  which
the  deficit  is  financed.
The  benefits  of the food subsidy  program  of course  come from  higher
real  wages and  higher  real transfers  to the low income  population,  which are
not inconsequential,  but  have  a  high  macro-economic  cost.
C.  Wage-Price  Decontrol  with  Devaluation
(i) Without  Fiscal  Adjustment
The  last simulation looks at the likely impact of wage-price
decontrol.  As shown  in the  previous  section,  Zimbabwe  has  used  wage and  price
controls to keep inflation in check. The cost of this form of inflation
control in terms of efficiency  losses is of course difficult  to assess.
Moreover,  as shown  by the  experience  of Latin  American  countries  such  policies
are difficult  to keep in place for long periods  of time.  The question  that
worries  policy  makers  in  Zimbabwe  is  the  likely  inflationary  consequences  of  a
program  of  wage and  price  decontrol.-64-
In this simulation  we allow for a 12.5% increase  in wages in the
first year of the program. There is full monetary accommodation  and the
exchange  rate  adjusts  to the  higher  level  of domestic  prices  so as to  maintain
the  real  exchange  rate  at the  same  level  as in  the  base  run.
Real exports  and consequently  real  imports  remain  at the  same level.
As a result  real  output  at first  is  kept  at the  same  level  as in the  base  run.
We later allow for efficiency improvements  to accompany price and wage
decontrol, leading to a decline in the import/GDP  ratio. However, their
precise  magnitude  is  difficult  to  quantify.
The  results show that wage-price decontrol will lead to high
inflation,  averaging  27 percent  per annum compared  to about 15 percent  per
annum in the base run. In the first  year inflation  will be about  35 percent
per  annum.  These  results  suggest  that  the  authorities  must  use  fiscal-monetary
policy  to keep inflation  in check  during  the transition  phase  when the  price
controls  are unravelling.  This will have to take the form of less than full
monetary  accommodation  of the price changes,  requiring  cuts in the fiscal
deficit.
The  high inflation  following  wage-price  decontrol  is entirely  due  to
the fact that we have assumed full monetary accomodation,  no built-in
inflationary  destabilizers,  and  a change  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  based  on
a PPP formula  to  maintain  competitiveness,  as well  as no changes  in the  level
of efficiency  of the  system.  One feature  of price  controls  is a reduction  in
the rate of profitability  leading  to reduced  efficiency  in the system.  With
liberalization  the profit rate rises back to its equilibrium  level.  To
explore  possible  output  consequences  a relationship  between  the profit  rate
and output is postulated, though it should be emphasized that this is
illustrative.-65-
In this simulation  we allow for a supply  elasticity  of 0.5 to the
change  in the rate of profit  in the  output  equation.  The output  equation  is
now  modified  in the  following  way:
log  q- log  qcap  - aO  +  al log(qinp)  +  a2 (*)
where  aO and al are from Equation 42, a2 is the value of the
elasticity  of output  to changes  in the  rate of profit  (*),  and  takes  a value
of  0.5.
In this case the  increase in output dampens the inflationary
pressures.  Average  inflation  is  now  only  19  percent  per  annum  compared  with  27
percent  per annum in the previous  simulation.  Tnflation  in the first year
however  continues  to be high at around  34 percent,  because  the increase  in
output  and  its  subsequent  deflationary  effect  takes  time.
This run indicates  that if the governments  price liberalisation  is
not credible  then  the increased  output  effects  we have  just described  will  be
delayed  as private  producers  develop  confidence  in the  liberalisation.  In the
interim  inflation  will rise to historically  very  high levels  and  may force  a
reversal  of the  program.
(ii) Fiscal  Reduction  with  Price  Decontrol:  The  Output-Inflation
Trade-off
One way  around the inflationary spiral that accompanies price
liberalization  is  a reduction  in  the  fiscal  deficit. However,  here  again  some
difficult choices have to be faced.  Some expenditures  such as interest
pavments  cannot  be cut  unless  one  defaults  or renegotiates.  The  wage  bill  and
subsidies  often cannot  be cut for welfare  or socio-political  reasons.  The
cuts  often  fall  on  public  investment  (Chhibber  and  Khalilzadeh-Shirazi,  1988).-66-
This  has  growth  implications.  We simulate  wage  and  price  decontrol  with a cut
in the  public  investment  program  which  reduces  the  budget  deficit  just enough
to leave  inflation  at the  same  level  as in the  base  run.
The cut in public investment  leads to a decline in actual  output.
The simulation  shows  a cumulative  cut in output  equal  to 15%  of its  base run
value  by year 5 i.e.  an average  of 3%  per annum.  This is a substantial  loss
in output  and shows  a significant  inflation-output  trade-off. The simulation
described  above  may be too  stark.  Cuts in uneconomic  public  investments  may
be possible  without  output  losses. Private  investment  may recover  to make-up
for the shortfall  in public  investment. Nevertheless,  policy  design  should
take into  account  these  potential  trade-offs,  especially  in the early  stages
of adjustment  when a moderate  degree  of inflation  (10-20%  range)  may have to
be endured  to  meet  growth  objectives.-67-
V.  CONCLUSIONS5
This analysis  of the determinants  of the inflationary  process  has
potentially  important  implications  for  economic  management  in Zimbabwe. This
is a major issue  in 1989  over the  question  of how to  unwind  the  price  freeze
and  deal  with the  expected  burst  in inflation. It is also  clearly  recognized
to be central  to two other  issues  that  will continue  to be of importance  in
the next few years:  the short  and medium  implications  of running  a budget
deficit  of around  10 percent  of GDP for a decade;  and the implications  of a
possible change in policy regime away from the complementary  systems  of
foreign exchange allocation and price controls.  Many in Zimbabwe are
(rightly)  concerned  that  attempts  to  undertake  growth-oriented  reforms  will  be
frustrated  by the  development  of a  unmanageable  acceleration  in inflation  with
wide reaching  consequences  for the economy. We conclude  by summarizing  what
we have learned  in the  three  areas  of  what  matters  for  inflation  in Zimbabwe,
what are the likely  prospects  for inflation  under alternative  scenarios  and
what  are the  key ingredients  of an approach  to  managing  inflation  in the  next
few  years.
What matters.  We have found that quite a few things  matter--the
management of the indexation  process, including  wage and regulated  price
policy,  the level  and composition  of finance  of the  fiscal.  deficits,  and the
supply  conditions  in the economy  are all important  and there are a strong
interactions  between the various  factors.  It is clearly  necessary  to go
beyond a  simple monetary account of the inflationary  process, even if
inflation  will always have a monetary dimension.  The situation  is best
characterized  in terms  of three  main  transmission  mechanisms  for  inflationary
impulses  in the  economy.-68-
First, there is the direct transmission  of exogenous  increases  in
cost-push factors.  This could be purely exogenous, as in the case of
increased  foreign  prices  of imports,  a function  of government  policies,  such
as exchange  rate,  wage or utility  pricing,  or due to supply  problems  in a
specific  market.  These  have  been found  to be important  in Zimbabwe  in three
areas--the  impact  of nominal  wage changes,  the passthrough  effects  of import
prices  (though  this is heavily  moderated  by indexation  policy--in  effect  no
consumer  prices  are fully  determined  by import  prices)  and  Government  policy
on fixed  prices  of food and services. These  have had positive  and negative
influences  in  different  years.
Second,  there  is the spillover  effects  of excess  money supply  i.e.
growth in money supply in excess  of the underlying  growth in money demand
(including  any  growth  in  money  necessary  to  meet  any  exogenous  price  increases
without  disrupting  real  economic  activity). The interactions  with the  fiscal
deficit,  and  its  mode  of finance  are  of  particular  importance  here.
Third, there is the impact  of relatively  favorable  or unfavorable
aggregate supply conditions in what is an essentially  supply-constrained
economy. In the  short  run  this  is  largely  determined  by import  availabilities
for  current  inputs  and in  the  medium  term  by the  level  of investment.
Prospects for Inflation.  The  analysis shows that the current
concerns  over inflation  are  well-founded.  A rise  in inflation  is expected  in
1989  as a consequence  of the  unravelling  of the  price  freeze. The  decision  to
impose  a price  freeze  in  mid-1987--involving  a shift  from  a partially  to  fully
controlled  price  regime--has  now left  the  Government  with  a difficult  economic
management  problem. The freeze  has genuinely  suppressed  some  prices  and led
to an accumulation  of inflationary  pressures  that is either  already  spilling-69-
over into  "uncontrolled'  prices  or awaiting  the  opportunity  for  a sharp  catch
up.  It  has  also  left  inflationary  expectations  in  an uncertain  state  and  this
will  provide  an additional  impulse  for  a surge  in  prices.
There  are  two  reasons  why  this  could  become  particularly
difficult--and  could lead to a  sustained rise in inflation.  First,  the
underlying  fiscal  imbalance remains a  continuing potential source of
inflationary  pressures.  As we have seen, the transmission  of excess  demand
pressures  from  the  fiscal  deficit  via the  fiscal-monetary  channel  has  not  been
strong in the past because  of an unusually  large private  savings  surplus.
This is fragile,  however,  as a consequence  of the  dynamics  of rising  interest
payments  on public  debt and  because  of uncertainties  over the sustainabilit.y
of so large  a private  savings  surplus. Any rise in private  investment--that
is essential  to future  output  increases--will  need to draw into  use some of
this surplus. Of equal  importance  is the  possible  adverse  consequences  of an
initial rise  in  inflation,  that both  tends  to  increase  the  deficit
(expenditures  respond  more  quickly  than  revenues)  and  because  there  could  be a
decline  in the willingness  of the public  to hold (via  the financial  system)
substantial  quantities  of long-term  public  debt.
Second  there  is  a high degree  of de facto  indexation  in the  economy,
notably  in the  predominantly  cost  plus  pattern  of  price-setting  and  the (quite
appropriate)  practice  of  managing  the  exchange  rate  to  at least  compensate  for
differentials  between domestic and foreign inflation.  Indexation  is not
comprehensive  and the  Government  does  have the option  of holding  down growth
in nominal wages  and  fixed prices of major foods, energy products and
utilities.  However,  the former  leads  to a decline  in the  real  wage--and  is
generally not sustainable--while  the latter  both generates  relative  price
distortions  in the economy  and tends to increase  the losses (or  reduce  the*70-
profits) of parastatals,  adding to the fiscal  deficit  and increasing  the
pressure  on inflation  from  that source. The last simulation  illustrated  the
potential  for  a substantial,  and sustained  rise in inflation. This would  of
course  make the Government's  overall  efforts  at macroeconomic  adjustment  and
policy  reform  more  difficult.
Managing Inflation.  What is an appropriate  approach  to managing
inflation  under  these  circumstances? The analysis  suggests  that  the core  of
any  approach  should  involve  measures  that  provide  an  endogenous
disinflationary  impulse  either from the supply  side, through increases  in
output,  or from  reductions  in the  public  sector  deficit. Interventions  in the
indexation  process  can  play a valuable  complementary  role  but carry  risks  of
adding to future problems.  Because of the costs and difficulties in
intervening  effectively (i.e. with permanent effects) in this area, and
because  of the  potentially  adverse  output  effects  of an  excessive  reduction  in
the fiscal  deficit,  a temporary  rise in inflation  will be inevitable  in some
circumstances.  Thus,  in 1989  it  would  be appropriate  to let  the  price  freeze
unwind  with a generalized  expectation  of a jump in prices.  This should  be
largely accommodated (in the short run) by increased  nominal wages, and
monetary  management,  and the opportunity  used to effect  changes  in relative
prices,  especially  amongst  administered  prices. In  other  words,  the  short  run
focus here should be on managing  inflation  without increasing  distortions
(including any real exchange  rate appreciation)  or raising  subsidies. The
issue  is not one  of avoiding  a rise  in inflation  but of  managing  a subsequent
disinflationary  process. Here,  as noted,  the  analytic  results  suggest  that  a
combination  of supply  improvement  and a reduced  fiscal  deficit  can  be quite
powerful  in Zimbabwe. Since  weather  cannot  be controlled,  the former  can  be
brought  about  most effectively  by relaxation  in the import  constraint  in the-71-
short run and investment  in new capacity  in the medium term.  The higher
capital inflows  can play an important  role here, but, to the extent that
prudent  borrowing  limits  preclude  this,  much greater  reliance  has  to  be placed
on measures  to get exports  up (including  the exchange  rate)  and reduce  the
deficit.  Both are at the core of the medium-term  solution,  since  each can
involve  an additional  cost-push  influence  (through  higher  import  prices  and
higher fixed  prices),  leading  to short-run  inflation  in order to get  higher
growth  and  lower  inflation  in  the  long  run.-72-
APPENDIX  1:  Testing  Alternative  Specification  of Expected  Inflation
Two alternative  hypothesis  on expected  inflation  were tested.  In the
first  we assume  rational  expectations. This leads to Equation  10 in Section
III,  with  the  estimated  results  presented  in  Table  III.1.
The alternative  hypothesis is that expected inflation is equal to
lagged  inflation  Pt-1.  In this  case  we get  the  following  reduced  form  equation:
p  - co  +  cl(*p)  +  c2(6+pf)  +  c3 l1g(m/Pt-1)  +  c4 log  y
+  c5i  +  c6 Pt-I
This was estimated for the period 1969-86  using TSLS and gave the
following  result:
p  0.7435  +  0.3425(*p)  +  0.1 375(6+pf)  +  0.0635  log(m/pt-1)
(1.83)  (2.59)  (2.43)  (1.46)
- 0.1467  log  y +  0.7786  i  +  0.1915  Pt-1
(2.27)  (3.32)  (1.31)
-2 0.83
D.W.  - 2.28
Since  this  is  basically  a test  for  the  inclusion  of an omitted  variable
Pt-1  we  used  an F-test  Kmenta  (1971).  The F-statistic is 1.59 which
categorically rejects the inclusion of Pt-1 as an additional explanatory
variable  in  the  model,  as Fl,  11 is  4.84.
For  testing  the  adaptive  expectations  we first  get  a predicted  value  of
p  from  the  following  equation:
p  - f  (P1.  12.  P3.  P4)
We then use the predicted  value as a proxy for pe.  The estimated
inflation  equation  is:
p  - 0.9598  +  0.3235(*p)  +  0.151 4(4+Pf)  +  0.0532  log(m/pt-1)
(2.30)  (2.59)  (2.82)  (1.27)
- 0.1682  log  y +  0.8528  i  +  0.4416  (pe)
(2.70)  (3.83)  (1.81)
R2  - 0.82
D.W.  - 2.42
The  F-statistic  is  3.13  which  again  categorically  rejects  the  inclusion
of pe as an additional  explanatory  variable,  as Fl,  11  is  4.84.-73-
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